

## Web Appendix for

### **Democracy and Trade Policy in Developing Countries**

University of Chicago Press

By:

Bumba Mukherjee

Professor, Department of Political Science

Penn State University

This Web Appendix is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present the estimates from additional tests that are briefly reported or mentioned – but are not presented in detail – in the book. These additional results are reported in tables A-F below. In the second part, I present some additional figures that are also discussed in the text. The contents in this web appendix document are available at: <http://press.uchicago.edu/sites/mukherjee/>

## **I. Additional Tables**

**Table A:** Summary Statistics for variables in chapter 3

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
impduty1	12.496085	8.698771	0	190.6076
Newtar	16.54092	12.19994	0	106.5
bop crisis	.5263008	.4993788	0	1
econ crisis	.0516407	.2213303	0	1
Capital account openness	-.2554726	1.41422	-1.843764	2.477618
new democracy	.0696903	.2546525	0	1
IMF program	.3505184	.4772011	0	1
log GDP	22.61039	1.990551	18.44204	28.62056
log population	15.44698	2.001255	10.59988	21.00442
log GDP per capita	7.108918	1.302277	4.130945	10.80627
labor mobility	10.1447	9.25443	-49.05200	106.784
ILM_elasticity	9.13136	13.79624	-28.71639	104.3012
GATT/WTO	.5669145	.495579	0	1
AGC index	.1259889	.0824778	.0031746	.9896191
Log REER	4.616312	0.27542	1.950311	6.072815
log capital-labor ratio	6.687962	4.180311	.0762	47.7012
Core NTBs	.2892684	.1717689	.0003925	.4938277

**Table B:** Summary Statistics for variables in chapter 5

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
veto players	3.532544	1.662797	1	18
partisanship	1.403957	1.147293	0	3
Federal	.5934101	.1777461	0	1
import duties	10.2561	16.27314	0	186.715
Statutory tariffs	15.13809	12.60496	0	106.5
bop crisis	.4684796	.4991598	0	1
econ crisis	.0502759	.2185807	0	1
capital account openness	-.1807026	1.368428	-1.843764	2.477618
GATT/WTO	.5324927	.4991853	0	1
Enlp	3.788201	2.077572	1.23	14.89
Particularism	6.27175	4.031973	1	13
IMF	.3602787	.4802486	0	1
Core NTBs	.1413805	.1175086	.0001246	.5202014
Log capital-labor ratio	6.978638	3.568709	.0762	24.45004
AGC index	.1278546	.0715633	.010746	.4592381
Core NTBs	.2284155	.1925316	.0002188	.4938277
Log GDP	22.86473	2.041936	18.58665	27.47787
Log population	15.32062	2.166157	10.59988	20.85426
Log GDP per capita	7.524373	1.164729	4.67313	9.812696
PR	.6409736	.4798772	0	1
Log REER	3.990125	0.183526	1.38016	5.98012
labor mobility	16.05913	8.914367	-47.52006	104.3723
ILM_elasticity	8.970696	13.29184	-28.71639	96.73463

**Table C:** Results for interactive effect of democracy and labor mobility

	<i>Import duties</i>	<i>Statutory tariff</i>	<i>Core NTBs</i>	<i>Import duties</i>	<i>Statutory tariff</i>	<i>Core NTBs</i>
	<b>model a</b>	<b>model b</b>	<b>model c</b>	<b>model d</b>	<b>model e</b>	<b>model f</b>
lag dependent variable	.126** (.064)	.143** (.072)	.102** (.053)	.098** (.044)	.094** (.045)	.111** (.046)
log GDP per capita	-.038*** (.012)	-.019*** (.005)	-.027** (.012)	-.035*** (.011)	-.015*** (.003)	-.021*** (.007)
capital account open	.162*** (.050)	.148*** (.043)	.035** (.017)	.121** (.039)	.107*** (.033)	.025** (.012)
bop crisis	-.095 (.102)	-.087 (.106)	.023 (.082)	-.031 (.065)	-.063 (.079)	-.036 (.079)
log GDP	-.125 (.117)	-.103 (.098)	-.073 (.084)	-.064 (.098)	-.079 (.084)	-.095 (.089)
econ crisis	-.008 (.005)	-.006 (.004)	-.015 (.010)	-.012 (.008)	-.004 (.003)	.005* (.003)
IMF program	-.067 (.058)	-.051 (.039)	-.010 (.033)	-.021 (.058)	-.020 (.075)	.009 (.063)
REER	-.566 (1.92)	-.461 (.775)	-.519 (.855)	-.811 (.747)	-.442 (.467)	-.460 (.684)
Democracy	.106 (.132)	.127 (.180)	.043 (.039)	.028 (.027)	.141 (.155)	.115 (.126)
labor mobility	.035 (.046)	.029 (.040)	.015 (.028)			
ILM				.030 (.064)	.032 (.096)	.039 (.077)
democracy x labor mobility	-.288*** (.090)	-.253*** (.072)	-.122*** (.037)			
democracy x ILM					-.179*** (.045)	-.107*** (.029)
log capital-labor ratio	.018 (.075)	.012 (.067)	.015 (.029)	.022 (.040)	.009 (.054)	.011 (.068)
GATT/WTO	-.037 (.028)	-.032 (.024)	-.070 (.069)	-.054 (.042)	-.014 (.027)	-.010* (.006)
AGC index	.125 (.227)	.144 (.175)	.118 (.210)	.121 (.211)	.119 (.108)	.136 (.217)
Constant	.474*** (.096)	.445*** (.084)	.189*** (.046)	.097*** (.025)	.334*** (.120)	.496*** (.082)
N	1619	1619	731	1619	1619	731

**Notes:** \*\*\*, \*\*, \*: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. PCSEs in parentheses. Models a-e are each estimated with country fixed effects that are not reported to save space. In the table, the dummy variable *democracy* is coded as 1 for the year in which a democratic transition occurred and for all the subsequent years in which the democratized state is observed as a democracy

**Table D:** Results for interactive effect of autocracy and labor mobility

	<i>import duties</i>	<i>statutory tariff</i>	<i>import duties</i>	<i>statutory tariff</i>	<i>Core NTBs</i>
	<b>model g</b>	<b>model h</b>	<b>model i</b>	<b>model j</b>	<b>model k</b>
lag dependent variable	.630*** (.125)	.573*** (.087)	.364*** (.075)	.411*** (.097)	.302** (.115)
log GDP per capita	-.018*** (.002)	-.019*** (.005)	-.035*** (.011)	-.015*** (.003)	-.000 (.005)
capital account open			.160*** (.051)	.149*** (.043)	
bop crisis			-.090 (.103)	-.085 (.103)	.014 (.019)
economic crisis			-.006 (.005)	-.005 (.004)	-.030* (.019)
IMF program			-.060 (.049)	-.052 (.058)	.002 (.099)
Autocracy	.093 (.164)	.085 (.152)	.036 (.129)	.027 (.112)	
labor mobility	.063 (.109)	.071 (.122)	.025 (.049)	.021 (.042)	
autocracy x labor mobility	.160 (.168)	.117 (.099)	.058 (.046)	.074 (.059)	
REER					-1.01* (.057)
Log GDP					-.020** (.010)
log capital-labor ratio			.014 (.037)	.011 (.055)	.093 (.128)
GATT/WTO			-.026 (.040)	-.019 (.026)	-.060 (.095)
AGC index			.081 (.223)	.109 (.158)	.119 (.255)
Constant	.688*** (.124)	.745*** (.181)	.489*** (.106)	.301** (.125)	1.24** (0.64)
N	1781	1703	1588	1588	725

**Notes:** \*\*\*, \*\*, \*: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. PCSEs in parentheses. Models are each estimated with country fixed effects that are not reported to save space.

**Table E:** Additional Panel probit Results for electoral fraud

	<i>All democracies sa</i>	<i>New democracies sa</i> <i>only</i>	<i>All democracies s</i>	<i>New democracies sa</i> <i>only</i>
	<b>model l</b>	<b>model m</b>	<b>model n</b>	<b>model o</b>
Lag electoral fraud	.155** (.077)	.192** (.086)	.203** (.095)	.149** (.068)
log GDP per capita	.084*** (.039)	.071** (.036)	.062** (.020)	.057** (.024)
Trade reform	-.084** (.045)	-.024** (.012)	-.080** (.040)	-.020* (.010)
New democracy	.053 (.078)		.047 (.084)	
Capital account openness	.199 (.280)	.151 (.132)	.115 (.316)	.170 (.155)
labor mobility			-.032* (.018)	-.027* (.015)
AGC index	.019* (.010)	.015 (.029)	.011 (.027)	.014 (.018)
British colony	.067 (.096)	.045 (.072)	.027 (.134)	.082 (.102)
Elf	-.041 (.040)	-.025 (.052)	-.034 (.041)	-.048 (.039)
Constant	.311*** (.060)	.427*** (.081)	.268*** (.085)	.327*** (.075)
Log Likelihood	-1054.1	-1285.6	-1697.3	-1482.1
N	1023	280	1023	280

**Notes:** \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The panel-probit models in this table are each estimated with random-effects.


**Table F:** First stage Probit Selection Equation Results for dependent variable *particularistic system*

	<b>Column A</b>
	Dependent variable <i>particularistic system</i>
	<i>Selection Equation for our equation in model 12, table 5.3</i>
log GDP per capita	-.032 (.049)
lag particularistic system	.095*** (.031)
closed-list PR	-.040** (.018)
Stv	.010** (.005)
smd ballot	.023** (.011)
civil war	-.012 (.105)
Constant	-1.211*** (.387)
% correctly predicted	89.2%
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.000


**Notes:** \*\*\*, \*\*, \*: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.

## II. Additional Figures

Figure A: Newly democratized regimes, *labor mobility* and import duties



**Figure B:** Bivariate Results: Labor Mobility and Import duties in Candidate-Centered Democracies





**Figure C:** Bivariate Results: Labor Mobility and Import duties in Party-Centered Democracies

